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This paper presents analysis of the implicit subsidies and repayment hardships of 
Thailand’s Student Loan Fund (SLF). Comparisons are made between the current SLF 
with alternative similar schemes, assuming different rates of interest and loan 
repayment periods.  We find that the implicit interest rate subsidy is about 66  per 
cent, with much of this being due to the fact that the scheme charges only a 1 per cent 
per annum nominal interest rate.  
 
The repayment hardships, measured as the proportion of a graduate’s income 
allocated to servicing the debt, are around 4 and 3 per cent, for female and male 
graduates earning average incomes by age. However, these increase to 12 and 10 per 
cent for female and males whose earnings are in the bottom deciles. 
 
The current SLF is generous in terms of repayment hardship for the borrowers. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Human capital is important for social and economic development. One most sensible 
way to enhance the quality of a country’s human capital is to promote education. 
However, in developing countries, the access to education, especially high 
educational levels, is limited because a large number of populations are poor. 
Therefore, the government has to play an important role in establishing a student 
loans scheme to reduce inequality of education, which will eventually increase the 
country’s economic growth.   
 
From the point of view of the government, as a loan provider, some key issues 
regarding a student loans scheme are allocation and distribution, recovery, collection 
and administration, and repayment conditions.
1  The government also needs to be 
concerned about an efficiency of resource allocation to the student loans scheme. 
From the point of view of loan borrowers, although they receive the opportunity to 
access to higher education and earn higher income, required loan repayment with 
strict conditions may increase the borrowers’ repayment hardship.  These issues lead 
to the tradeoff between the government’s subsidy and the borrowers’ repayment 
difficulties.  
 
Previous studies have investigated student loans schemes in many countries, for 
example, in Australia (Chapman and Ryan, 2002; Chapman, 2006), Europe and the 
US (Johnstone, 1986), Africa (Johnstone and Amero, 2001; Johnstone, 2004), and 
South East Asia (Ziderman, 2004).
2 Our goal is to fully analyze both the implicit 
subsidies related to the Student Loans Fund (SLF) and the repayment hardship of loan 
recipients in Thailand for an undergraduate level. An important and similarly 
motivated study by Ziderman (2003) comes to comparable conclusions with respect to 
both overall implicit subsidies and repayment hardships calculated at the mean of the 
                                                 
1 Loan repayment conditions refer to interest charges and repayment schedule. 
2 Although Thailand’s student loans cover upper secondary, vocational and undergraduate education, 
most student loans schemes over the world cover only higher education (Ziderman, 2003). Therefore, 
in this paper our analysis will be based on higher education.   2
data.
3 However, and most importantly, this study is the first to analyze the repayment 
hardship of SLF’s borrowers for graduates with very low incomes.  
 
This study is structured as follows. Section 2 describes background of the SLF in 
Thailand. Section 3 discusses current issues of the SLF. Sections 4 and 5 analyze the 
implicit subsidy and repayment hardship, respectively. The last section concludes the 
study. 
 
2  Background to the Student Loans Fund  
 
2.1 History of the Student Loans Fund  
The history of student loans in Thailand began in 1996 when the government, led by 
Chartthai Party, established the Student Loans Fund. The idea of the student loans, 
nevertheless, was originated in 1995 under the government led by Democrat Party.
4 
The main objective of the SLF is to enhance an access to upper secondary and higher 
education for students from low-income families.
5 The ultimate goals are to reduce 
the inequality of education between the rich and the poor and to develop human 
resources in the country. This will at least help to achieve economic growth and 
enhance the competitive capacity of Thailand (Student Loans Fund Act, 1998).  
 
To serve its purposes, the SLF provides the loans for upper secondary, vocational and 
undergraduate education to students whose family income does not exceed 150,000 
baht per annum.
6 It has been allocated the national budget, on average, of 27,000 
million baht per annum. As reported by Krung Thai Bank as of March 2008, the 
government has subsidized the SLF for the approximate total amount of 280,000 
million baht to about 2.9 million loan recipients from 1996 to 2007. 
                                                 
3  Examples of previous studies are Ziderman (2003) and Tangkitvanich and Manasboonphempool 
(2006). 
4 Under the Thai Rak Thai Party government, the SLF scheme was changed to Thailand’s Income 
Contingent and Allowance Loan (TICAL) scheme in 2006. Then when the government was ousted by 
the coup, the TICAL was switched back to the SLF until now. The detailed discussion of TICAL is 
provided in Chapman and Luonkaew (2008). 
5 However, the average rate of continuing the upper secondary level has slightly declined during the 
period 1997-1999, which should be mostly due to the East Asian economic crisis in 1997 (Weesakul, 
2006). 
6 The threshold family income of a loan recipient was originally set at 120,000 baht in 1996. Then it 
was raised to 300,000 baht in 1997 and remained in place until 1999 when it was reduced to 150,000 
baht, which was the median household income in 2002 (Weesakul, 2006; Ziderman, 2003).   3
2.2 How the SLF Works 
Loan budget allocation and loan distribution 
In each fiscal year, the SLF will estimate the total amount of fund needed for loan 
distribution in that year, and submit a request to Bureau of the Budget, Ministry of 
Finance. The annual allocated budget of the SLF will then be divided into (1) the loan 
budget for upper secondary and vocational education, and (2) the loan budget for 
undergraduate education. To our focus, the loan budget for undergraduate education 
will be allocated directly to each university, through the Commission on Higher 
Education (formerly the Ministry of University Affairs). The loan budget allocated to 
a university is based on the number of loan recipients in the previous years. At the 
institutional level, the university’s loan committee authorizes the distribution of loan 
budget to eligible students and oversees the process of loan applications. Within the 
limitation set by the Commission on Higher Education, a university makes decision 
on individual loans distributed to its students.  
 
The SLF loans cover tuition fees and educational related expenses, as well as living 
allowance during a studying period. For the undergraduate level, which is the focus of 
our analysis, the loan ceiling for a tuition fee and educational related expenses are set 
differently, depending on field of study, ranging from 60,000 baht to 150,000 baht per 
year. The living allowance loan, including accommodation and personal expenses, is 
limited to 24,000 baht per year.
7   
 
Loan repayment  
Since the SLF loans are provided to students from low-income families, the 
conditions for interest charge and principal repayment have been set to lessen debtors’ 
burden. First, there is a seven-year interest charged grace period between the first 
enrollment and the first debt repayment. Second, there is a two-year repayment grace 
period after a loan recipient graduates or stops borrowing. Following the two-year 
grace period, the loan recipient is required to repay his or her debt for 15 years.
8 Third, 
a flat interest rate of only 1 per cent per annum is charged throughout the repayment 
period. The annual loan repayment is calculated as the proportion of total loan, 
                                                 
7 Source: Office of Student Loans Fund’s website (www.studentloan.or.th). 
8 A loan recipient may choose to start repaying his or her debt during the two-year grace period. Also, a 
loan recipient may choose to pay off the debt in less than 15 years.     4
ranging from 1.5 per cent in Year 1 to 13 per cent in Year 15.
9 It seems that the SLF 
loans have the potential to provide “consumption smoothing”, meaning that the 
proportion of loan repayment grows with the borrower’s expected earnings. Table 1 
shows an example of loan repayment schedule, assuming the loan amount of 200,000 
baht.  
 


















1  1.5  3,000 -     3,000           197,000 
2  2.5  5,000 1,970     6,970           192,000 
3  3.0  6,000 1,920     7,920           186,000 
4  3.5  7,000 1,860     8,860           179,000 
5  4.0  8,000 1,790     9,790           171,000 
6  4.5  9,000 1,710   10,710           162,000 
7  5.0  10,000 1,620   11,620           152,000 
8  6.0  12,000 1,520   13,520           140,000 
9  7.0  14,000 1,400   15,400           126,000 
10  8.0  16,000 1,260   17,260           110,000 
11  9.0  18,000 1,100   19,100             92,000 
12  10.0  20,000 920   20,920             72,000 
13  11.0  22,000 720   22,720             50,000 
14  12.0  24,000 500   24,500             26,000 
15  13.0  26,000 260   26,260                    -   
Total  100.0  200,000      
 
Fourth, if a loan recipient is unemployed or encounters a natural disaster, riot, or war, 
he or she can apply for a six-month suspension, but in total not more than two years. 
If a loan recipient’s income falls below the threshold income of 4,700 baht per month, 
he or she can request not to pay the total amount of required payment. In this case, the 
borrower has to pay a minimum of 300 baht per month or 2,400 baht per year, and it 
has to be higher than the interest charged for that repayment period. If a loan recipient 
fails to repay his or her debt, he or she will face the penalty between 12 per cent and 
18 per cent of the installment principal. Finally, upon a loan recipient’s decease or 
disability to work, the loan will be automatically forgiven. 
                                                 
9 However, a loan recipient can choose to repay the debt more or faster than what is specified in the 
repayment schedule.   5
 
Loan collection 
Krung Thai Bank (KTB), a government-owned bank, is responsible for the SLF loan 
collection. Once the two-year repayment grace period ends, due borrowers are 
required to contact KTB to arrange the loan repayment by the 5
th of July in that year. 
The borrowers have two choices in paying back the debt. First, they may pay the total 
due amount for the particular period. Second, they may apply for an installment of 12 
monthly payments. During 15 years of the loan repayment period, KTB will inform 
due borrowers of the amounts to be paid one month prior to the due date, i.e., the 5
th 
of July. Again, the borrowers have two choices to settle the repayment schedule for 
each particular year. If due borrowers fail to arrange the payment, follow-up by mail, 
telephone, and home visit will be made depending on the length of the delinquency 
period.  
 
2.3 The Importance of our Study 
In this study, we focus on the analyses of the implicit subsidy by the government and 
the repayment hardship of SLF loan recipients. We realize that the implicit subsidy 
issues have already been discussed in Ziderman (2003), Tangkitvanich and 
Manasboonphempool (2006), and Shen and Ziderman (2008). There are similarities in 
many dimensions to the analysis of Ziderman and we consider this to be an important 
affirmation of policy concerns with respect to the SLF. As is the case with Ziderman 
(2003), we are able to show the extent to which the implicit subsidy can be traced to 
different policy components of the loan, i.e., interest rates charged, interest grace 
periods, and repayment grace periods. We find that all components matter and that, 
roughly, the role of interest rate subsidies is about the same as the other factors 
combined. 
 
As with Ziderman (2003) we calculate repayment hardships for loan repayments 
estimated with respect to average incomes; using more sophisticated earnings profiles 
we come to quite similar conclusions. More importantly, our study contributes to the 
policy debate in two unusual respects concerning repayment hardships. One, we are 
able to calculate repayment burdens for graduates of different ages, and not just at the 
mean. Two, and most significantly, we are able to estimate the extent of repayment 
hardships for graduates with very low incomes, those in the bottom decile of the   6
earnings distribution by both sex and age. Our approach allows us to explore fairly 
specifically the potential policy trade-off between implicit interest rate subsidies and 
repayment burdens  
 
3  Current Issues Concerning the SLF 
 
3.1 Nominal Interest Rate of 1 per cent 
The nominal interest rate charged to SLF loans is fixed at 1 per cent until the loans are 
fully paid. The 1 per cent interest rate assists loan recipients to bear a very low cost of 
their education because it is much lower than market interest rates. Currently, the term 
deposit interest rate of the Government Saving Bank is 3 per cent and the interest rate 
of long-term government bonds is 5 per cent.
10 It means that the government has to 
subsidize the SLF at least about 2-3 per cent over the 15-year repayment schedule. 
 
Furthermore, the 1 per cent interest rate charged highly affects the present value of 
repayment in the future. Assuming that an average inflation rate is 4 per cent, the 
government subsidizes loan recipients about 3 per cent. The amount of repayment 
reduces through time at a real rate of 3 per cent. When the total loans, charged with 1 
per cent interest rate, are fully paid after 21 years (4-year course of study, 2-year 
grace period and 15-year repayment period), the government would receive much 
lesser amount of money in real term.  
 
3.2 Grace Period 
The SLF allows loan recipients to start loan repayment two years after their 
graduation. The two-year grace period of repayment benefits loan recipients, but 
increases the government subsidy. Moreover, since the loan application date, the 
borrowers are not obliged to pay interest, or to make a repayment for seven years, 
meaning that the government has to bear a high cost of lending for the seven-year 
interest grace period. In addition to this, the SLF allows the borrowers to postpone 
their repayment in a total period of two years if they are unemployed or face a natural 
disaster, riot, or war.  
 
                                                 
10 The Bank of Thailand as of May 2008 (www.bot.or.th)   7
3.3 Administration/Collection Cost 
It might be arguable that the administration process under the SLF leads to high 
expenses because it is involved with several parties. The SLF hires KTB to be 
responsible for loan approval process and “normal” loan collection. In the fiscal year 
of 2008, KTB is allocated the overall administration cost about 227 million baht.
11 
The bank is in charge of loan approval after receiving all relevant documents from 
borrowers’ educational institutions. Through KTB, tuition fee loans are paid directly 
to an educational institution, while monthly allowances and expenses are credited to 
borrowers’ KTB bank accounts. During the loan collection process, KTB will inform 
borrowers the amount of payment, and if the borrowers fail to repay the loan, KTB 
will follow up by mail and phone. 
 
After five years of repayment schedule, the unpaid loans will be classified as 
“delinquent” loans. For the delinquent loans, the Legal Affairs Division of Office of 
SLF contracts out many law firms to follow up. From an interview with Professor Dr. 
Boonserm Weesakul, an SLF’s honorary board member, at the steady state, 
approximately 34,000 cases are sent to law firms every year. The total cost of loan 
collection paid to law firms is set to be about 521 million baht, and the SLF plans to 





The high level of government subsidy to the SLF also stems from default loss. Several 
students may not meet their loan repayment obligation, meaning that when and if a 
borrower’s income is low for a period, he or she will face a difficulty to repay the loan. 
Also, some students may still be unemployed until the two-year grace period of 
payment finishes, or may continue a postgraduate course. In addition, the probability 
of default loss may be increased by contract breach and death of loan recipients.  
 
Table 2 shows the summary of loan repayment of 1999-2006 due cohorts of 
borrowers. Official figures show that, for each due cohort, about 40 per cent of due 
borrowers commence their repayment in July of the first repayment year, while 60 per 
                                                 
11 Weesakul, B. (2008, pers. comm., 10 May) referred to the figures from the SLF’s budget of 2008. 
12 The figures are from the SLF’s budget of 2008.   8
cent of due borrowers fail to make any repayment. The unpaid borrowers may include 
ones who are not able to repay and request for deferral of loan repayment, or ones 
who do not commit to their loan repayment. After the first five years of repayment 
schedule, the proportion of payers to due borrowers increases to about 80 per cent. 
This five-year period is a cutoff point for the Legal Affairs Division of Office of SLF 
to handle delinquent loans. The legal procedure helps force due borrowers to repay 
loans to some degree. Therefore, the first two due cohorts, i.e. due cohorts 1999 and 
2000, show that around 15 per cent of the due borrowers do not pay after eight years, 
which should be considered as a steady state. This 15 per cent default loss will be 
used in implicit subsidy calculation.   
 

























1999  18,672  15.93 68.18 76.84 81.00 82.85 85.56 88.58 89.77 88.51 
2000  66,555    38.92 74.83 76.80 79.15 79.87 82.66 87.79 87.31 
2001  135,314      41.21 66.60 72.00 73.22 73.85 80.05 82.65 
2002  207,102     40.30  61.01  66.21 67.28 68.36 74.60 
2003  226,105      39.19  58.78  61.06  62.63  62.78 
2004  245,961       41.13  62.94  65.31  65.74 
2005  281,070        39.34  60.38  63.50 
2006  275,580         4 5 . 8 9   6 2 . 9 7  
Source: Report on student loan payment and repayment, the SLF (1999-2006) by KTB as of 
May 2007 
 
4 Implicit  Subsidies 
 
In order to calculate the implicit subsidy, we first assume that an average loan per 
head of university students, including tuition fees and living expenses, is equivalent to 
200,000 baht for a four-year course.  
 
Table 3 shows an average tuition fee (four-year course) and the number of borrowers 
at each type of universities in Thailand. The average tuition fee varies across the type 
of universities. As expected, the average tuition fee per course of a private university 
is the highest, which is 180,000 baht. A public university charges approximately 
72,000 baht per course, while the average tuition fee of a Rajamangala University of 
Technology is 48,000 baht per course. The lowest average tuition fee is 48,000 baht   9
per course at a Rajabhat university. The proportion of borrowers is 37 per cent at a 
Rajabhat university, followed by 30 per cent at a private university, 22 per cent at a 
public university and 11 per cent at a Rajamangala University of Technology.  
 
Table 3: Average tuition fee per course and number of borrowers in 2003 
Types of universities  Average tuition fee 
(Baht) 
No. of borrowers 
Private University  180,000  100,489 
Public University  72,000  75,469 
Rajamangala University of Technology 48,000  39,069 
Rajabhat University   36,000  125,546 
Source: Office of Student Loans Fund 
 
Weighted average tuition fee  
= Average tuition fee per course × Number of borrowers at each type of universities 
Total number of borrowers 
 
From these figures, we calculate the weighted average tuition fee per course in 2003, 
which is about 88,000 baht per person. To make a simple calculation, we assume that 
the weighted average tuition fee per course in 2008 is approximately 100,000 baht per 
borrower. In addition, university students can borrow monthly expenses, including 
accommodation and living expenses, from the SLF. According to borrowing 
conditions of the SLF, each student can borrow a personal expense loan of 2,000 baht 
per month.
13 Hence, the total personal expense loan amount for a four-year course is 
96,000 baht per person. Together with the tuition fee loan, we assume that an 
approximate total loan for a four-year university course is 200,000 baht per head. 
 
Furthermore, we assume an inflation rate of 4 per cent, which is the average inflation 
rate from 2004 to 2007.
14 The inflation rate is used to adjust the amount of loan 
repayment in each year over the 15-year repayment period to a real term of money. 
We also assume a discount rate of 3 per cent, which is quoted by a general agreement 
of Times Preference Experts. We use the discount rate to calculate the present values 
of total payment, loan amount, and collection costs.  
                                                 
13 Source: SLF’s Handbook, Office of Student Loans Fund 
14 The Bank of Thailand reports the inflation rates of 2.7  per cent in 2004, 4.5 per cent in 2005, 4.7 per 
cent in 2006, and 2.3 per cent in 2007 (www.bot.or.th).   10
 
The collection costs are assumed to be 3 per cent of the total payment over the 15-
year repayment period and it is added to the total loan amount per borrower. Referring 
to the previous section, the total collection costs are 763 million baht per year, 
including fees paid to KTB and law firms, and expenses to promote loan repayment. 
The approximate collection costs of 3 per cent are the proportion of total collection 
costs (763 million baht) to outstanding loans per year (27,000 million baht). 
 
The default loss of 15 per cent is used to adjust the total repayment over the 15-year 
repayment period. Default loss is assumed to mean that 15 per cent of the borrowers 
pay nothing over the repayment period, while 85 per cent of the borrowers pay a full 
amount. These figures are from Table 2, which shows that it is likely that 85 per cent 
of total due borrowers pay back loan at the steady state (Weesakul, B. 2008, pers. 
comm., 10 May).  
 
The calculation of the implicit subsidy in this study turns out to be similar to Shen and 
Ziderman (2008), which is shown in Table 4 below.  
 








cost collection total of PV amount loan total of PV
loss loan by adjusted payment total of PV
1  
 
The current SLF is examined under repayment conditions of a 1 per cent nominal 
interest rate charged to total loan amount, a two-year grace period of repayment, 
interest charged three years after graduation, and a repayment schedule of 15 years. In 
addition to the analysis of the current SLF, we also analyze three comparison SLF 
schemes, which vary in terms of the number of grace periods of repayment and 
interest charged. Moreover, we propose to analyze the schemes with the adjustment of 
the interest rate, 1 per cent versus 7 per cent. The nominal interest rate of 7 per cent is 
equivalent to a real rate of interest of 3 per cent, given that the inflation rate is 4 per 
cent. If the government’s cost of borrowing is 3 per cent, this interest subsidy will be 
removed. Table 4 shows the results of implicit subsidy calculation of four different 
schemes with two interest rate regimes. 
   11
Table 4: Implicit subsidies 
Nominal interest rate (per cent)  1   7  
Two-year repayment grace period and interest rate charged three 
years after graduation 
65.68 44.62 
No repayment grace period and interest rate charged three years 
after graduation 
60.57 36.44 
Two-year repayment grace period and interest rate charged on 
enrollment 
50.55 20.29 
No repayment grace period and interest rate charged on enrollment  46.60  19.92 
 
Table 4 shows that the implicit subsidy of the current SLF is 65.68 per cent, which is 
similar to Shen and Ziderman (2008) and Tangkitvanich and Manasboonphempool 
(2006).  Specifically, Shen and Ziderman (2008) report 28.21 per cent of the loan 
recovery ratio, incorporating default loss, which is equivalent to 71.79 per cent of the 
implicit subsidy. Using the same approach as Shen and Ziderman (2008), 
Tangkitvanich and Manasboonphempool (2006) show that the loan recovery ratio is 
33.2 per cent (i.e. the implicit subsidy is 66.8 per cent), assuming a discount rate of 4 
per cent and the default rate of 10 per cent. The differences in the implicit subsidy 
calculations derive from different estimation formula and assumptions of inflation rate, 
discount rate, default loss, and collection costs.  
 
As with Ziderman (2003) our results indicate that the implicit subsidy is affected 
significantly by the interest rate charged, the grace period of repayment, and the grace 
period in which interest is not charged. Interest rate subsidies are an important aspect 
of the government subsidy and these arise because interest rates charged on debt are 
typically lower than the borrowing cost of the government. If we adjust the nominal 
interest rate from 1 per cent to 7 per cent, meaning that the real interest rate is 3 per 
cent (equivalent to the discount rate we use), the implicit subsidy decreases to 45 per 
cent. This could be roughly summarized that 1 per cent of the interest rate charged to 
the loan reduces the implicit subsidy by about 3.5 per cent.  
 
We estimate also the effect of changes in the repayment grace period on the subsidy. 
Based on other conditions of the current SLF system, the implicit subsidy declines 
from 65.68 per cent to 60.57 per cent if borrowers are required to make a repayment 
after the graduation (zero repayment grace period). The interest grace period also has 
an impact on the implicit subsidy. If the interest is imposed on enrollment, the implicit   12
subsidy reduces to 50.55 per cent. Even assuming no grace period of repayment and 
interest charged on enrollment, the implicit subsidy roughly declines from 65.68 per 
cent to 46.60 per cent. These results indicate that the impact of the interest rate 
charged on the implicit subsidy is much stronger than that of the repayment grace 
period and that of the interest grace period.  
 
Under the schemes of 7 per cent interest rate charged on SLF, the implicit subsidy 
decreases to 36.44 per cent when there is no grace period of repayment. If we 
drastically alter the current SLF, assuming 7 per cent interest rate charged, zero 
repayment grace period and interest rate charged on enrollment, the implicit subsidy 
substantially reduces to 19.92 per cent
15, or to less than a third of the estimate for the 
current SLF of about 65 per cent. The findings of Table 4 suggest that the impact of 
grace period parameters on the implicit subsidy is greater at the high interest rate.  
  
We also calculate the implicit subsidy assuming that the default loss is 20 per cent and 
everything else remains constant. This 20 per cent default loss refers to the proportion 
of unpaid due borrowers after the five-year period cutoff point for the Legal Affairs 
Division of Office of SLF to handle delinquent loans. Results available from the 
authors show that at the interest rate of 1 per cent, the implicit subsidy increases by 
around 2 per cent, while at the interest rate of 7 per cent, it increases by about 4 per 
cent, compared to the current SLF with an assumed 15 per cent default loss. As 
expected, at a higher interest rate charged, the impact of default loss on the implicit 
subsidy is greater. However, adjusting the default loss does not significantly change 
our analysis of the implicit subsidy. 
 
5  Repayment Hardships  
 
5.1 Data and Methodology 
To investigate the repayment hardship of loan recipients, we use the age-earnings 
profile of average Thais with an undergraduate degree provided by Chapman and 
Lounkaew (2008)
16. They construct age-earnings profiles of Thai graduates using data 
                                                 
15  The fact that some subsidies remain can be traced to overall defaults and administration costs built 
into the analysis. 
16 Ziderman (2003) calculates repayment burdens using average earnings only.   13
from the 2006 Labor Force Survey conducted by the National Statistical Office. The 
sample is classified into female and male graduates. Their income is measured as 
wages from their main jobs with a minimum of 20 working hours per week and the 
estimated income of average graduates is constructed based on the Ordinary Least 




Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics of the sample’s earnings. The number of 
observations is 6,899 and 9,871 for male and female graduates, respectively. On 
average, female graduates earn approximately 172,000 baht per year, which is lower 
than the male graduates’ earning of about 190,000 baht per year. The minimum wages 
of female graduates are 13,200 baht per year, while male graduates earn at least 
18,200 baht per year.  
 
Moreover, to examine how the repayment hardship of loan recipients under the SLF 
scheme will be different when the loan recipients earn much lower than the average, 
we use the age-earnings profile of graduates whose income is in the bottom 10 per 
cent, i.e., unlucky graduates. To calculate the estimated future income of unlucky 
graduates, we also use the same regression model as that of average graduates. The 
descriptive statistics of unlucky graduates in Table 5 show that the number of 
observations for unlucky graduates is 1,038 and 668 for female and male graduates, 
respectively. The minimum earning of unlucky female graduates is 12,500 baht, but 
on average they earn 75,994.96 baht. As for unlucky male graduates, their average 
income is 78,972.62 baht, which is higher than that of female ones. 
Table 5:  Descriptive statistics of age-earnings profile data 
Sub-Sample 
No. of 
observations Min  Max  Mean Median  Std  dev 
Female graduates  9,871  13,200  480,003  172,116.1  148,800  85,172.42 


























                                                 
17  There is a possible unemployment issue. However, it is probably not very serious because the 
average unemployment rate of female and male graduates during the 15-year repayment period is only 
around 8 per cent and 4 per cent, respectively. 
 
   14
The age-earnings profile over a period of working life of average female and male 
graduates and that of unlucky female and male graduates are shown in Figure 1 and 
Figure 2, respectively. 









22 27 32 37 42 47 52 57
Female Male
Age
Baht/Yr Earning profile (Average graduates)
 













To calculate the repayment hardship, there are four sub-samples in our analysis, i.e. 
average female graduates, average male graduates, unlucky female graduates and 
unlucky male graduates. The repayment hardship is calculated as below.  
income Total
repayment loan Total
hardship Repayment =    15
The total loan repayment of each period is adjusted to a real term, using the inflation 
rate of 4 per cent and total income, estimated by the regression model, is in a real term. 
 
5.2 Analysis 
Consistent with the implicit subsidy analysis, we calculate the average repayment 
hardship over the 15-year repayment period of average female and male graduates as 
well as unlucky female and male graduates under the four different SLF schemes. The 
results are presented in Table 6.  
Table 6: Average repayment hardships (per cent) 
Schemes  Interest rate 1 per cent  Interest rate 7.0 per cent 
Average Unlucky Average  Unlucky 
Female Male  Female Male  Female Male Female Male 
2 Rep, 3 Int
a  4.19 3.47 12.44 9.72 6.87 5.74 20.13  15.81
0 Rep, 3 Int
b  4.55 3.76 14.20 11.21 7.45 6.22 23.01  18.28
2 Rep, 0 Int
c  4.46 3.70 13.21 10.33 9.72 8.17 28.32  22.30
0 Rep, 0 Int
d  5.12 4.33 14.79 11.69 10.22 8.78 28.95  23.06
a2 Rep, 3 Int refers to “Two-year repayment grace period and interest charged 3 years after graduation”. 
b0 Rep, 3 Int refers to “No repayment grace period and interest charged 3 years after graduation”. 
c2 Rep, 0 Int refers to “Two-year repayment grace period and interest charged on enrollment”. 
d0 Rep, 0 Int refers to “No repayment grace period and interest charged on enrollment”. 
 
As expected, under the current SLF scheme (2 Rep, 3 Int with the interest rate of 1 per 
cent), the average repayment hardship of the borrowers is the lowest among all 
schemes. For females and males we find repayment burdens of 4.2 and 3.5 per cent. 
Ziderman (2003) has similar findings of 3.5 and 2.2 per cent. The findings of most 
interest from our exercises relate to repayment hardships for our unlucky graduates. 
 
We find that for unlucky female and male graduates the average repayment hardship 
are around 12 and 10 per cent. Given that Ziderman (2003) argues that repayment 
burdens of around these levels are acceptable in terms of loan design when calculates 
at the average, it follows that the current SLF can be considered to be quite generous.  
 
When we design a comparison SLF by changing the interest rate from 1 per cent to 7 
per cent (2 Rep, 3 Int with the interest rate of 7 per cent), the average repayment 
hardship of average graduates increases roughly by 2-3 per cent. Differently, the 
average repayment hardship of unlucky graduates increases around 6-8 per cent
18. 
                                                 
18 Again, these findings, based on average incomes, are not very different to those of Ziderman (2003).   16
 
As previously discussed, the implicit subsidy is very high under the current SLF 
scheme, but it can be considerably lowered if we remove all forms of subsidization. 
The question here is what will happen to the repayment hardship of loan recipients? In 
other words, how much the repayment hardship will change when 1) the interest rate 
increases from 1 per cent to 7 per cent, 2) there is no grace period for loan repayment, 
and 3) the interest is charged on enrollment? Table 6 shows that the average 
repayment hardship under this radically modified SLF scheme (0 Rep, 0 Int with the 
interest rate of 7 per cent) is as twice as much for all sub-samples, compared with the 
current SLF scheme. More precisely, the average repayment hardship increases from 
4.19 per cent and 3.47 per cent, to 10.22 per cent and 8.78 per cent for average female 
and male graduates, respectively. As for unlucky female and male graduates, the 
average repayment hardship increases from 12.44 per cent and 9.72 per cent, to 28.95 
per cent and 23.06 per cent, respectively. These findings show that for unlucky 
graduates, if the government decides to reduce the subsidy for student loans, they may 
have to pay as high as one-fourth of their income for the loan, on average. 
 
We then compare the repayment hardship over the 15-year repayment period of the 
current SLF and the radically modified SLF scheme (0 Rep, 0 Int with the interest rate 
of 7 per cent) for all sub-samples. Figure 3 shows that under the current SLF scheme, 
an average female graduate pays somewhat less than 4 per cent of her income at the 
beginning of the repayment period, reaching around 5 per cent at the end of the 
repayment period. Similarly, for an average male borrower, the proportion of loan 
repayment to income increases from about 3 per cent in the first year to about 4 per 
cent in the final repayment year. 
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Figure 4 shows the repayment hardship of unlucky graduates over the repayment 
period.  
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Compared with that of average graduates, the ratio of repayment to income of unlucky 
graduates is much higher. More precisely, the proportion of loan repayment to income 
is the lowest at about 8-11 per cent in the first year of repayment, rising to around 12 
and 16 per cent for females and males in the final repayment years. 
 
The proposed SLF scheme that charges 7 per cent interest rate on enrollment and 
requires the borrowers to pay immediately after graduation demonstrates a different 
pattern of repayment hardship, compared to the current SLF. This is shown in Figure 
5 for borrowers earning average incomes by sex. 
 
With the subsidies considerably reduced the data from Figure 5 show that an average 
female borrower repays about 9 per cent of her annual income at the start of the 
repayment period. This proportion increases consistently, to reach nearly 14 per cent 
of annual income in the final year of the repayment period. The results are similar for 
an average male borrower. Nevertheless, the repayment hardship of a male borrower 
is around 1-3 per cent lower than that of a female borrower at any given age during 
the repayment period. 
 
Figure 5: Proportion of total payment to total income of average graduates, 
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The repayment hardship of unlucky borrowers is shown in Figure 6.  
 
Figure 6: Proportion of total payment to total income of unlucky graduates, 
















The clearest point from Figure 6 is that the proportion of repayment to income of 
unlucky borrowers is substantially greater than that of graduates earning average 
incomes. Specifically, the proportion peaks at around 43 per cent and 32 per cent for 
unlucky female and male graduates, in the final year of the repayment period, after 
being around 20 and 18 per cent of annual income in the first repayment period.
19 
 
The analyses of the implicit subsidy and the repayment hardship suggest that if the 
government modifies the current SLF by increasing the interest rate to 7 per cent with 
no grace periods of repayment and interest charge, a very significant portion of the 
subsidy is reduced. More precisely, from Table 4 the implicit subsidy is reduced by 
over two-thirds, while the borrowers face greater difficulties in paying the loan, 
especially in the first several years.  This then is the dilemma facing the Thailand 
government with respect to the SLF: the implicit interest rate subsidies are so high as 
to render the scheme close to a grant, but removing these subsidies results in what 
                                                 
19 We allow direct comparisons of the repayment hardships between average and unlucky graduates 
under the current SLF and the three proposed SLF schemes in Appendix.  
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could be seen to be highly undesirable repayment hardships for the members of some 




We have analyzed for Thailand the implicit subsidy of the current SLF and the 
repayment hardship of borrowers. We compare the current SLF with alternative SLF 
schemes, assuming different grace periods of interest charged and loan repayment 
periods. In addition, we assume a 7 per cent nominal interest rate, instead of 1 per 
cent, for all schemes. This 7 per cent rate is to make the real interest rate of the SLF 
loan equivalent to the discount rate we have used in the analysis. 
 
Our analysis shows that the implicit subsidy drastically reduces, by approximately 46 
percentage points, when the nominal interest rate is increased from 1 per cent to 7 per 
cent and no grace period for both interest charge and loan repayment. With no 
changes to grace periods but using an interest rate of 7 per cent the implicit subsidy 
declines by about 21 percentage points. In the case that the interest rate remains 1 per 
cent, and if the grace periods of interest charge and loan repayment are removed, the 
implicit subsidy drops by about 20 percentage points. These findings are similar to 
those reported by Ziderman (2003), implying a strong consensus in this area of 
analysis with respect to the SLF. 
 
We considered also repayment hardship under the current SLF, and as with Ziderman 
(2003) we did the calculations using average earnings data. We find repayment 
hardships of average female and male graduates to be around 4 per cent and 3 per cent 
respectively. But the story becomes much more interesting when we consider 
repayment burdens for graduates earning in the bottom deciles by age and sex. 
Specifically, for the SLF, repayment hardships for unlucky female and male graduates 
are about 12 per cent and 10 per cent respectively. Given that Ziderman argues that 
burdens of these levels are acceptable if (estimated at the mean of the data), and we 
are considering the outcomes for very poor graduates indeed, the SLF is clearly a very 
generous student loan scheme. 
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Assuming that the interest rate increases to 7 per cent and the grace periods of interest 
charged and loan repayment are eliminated, the average repayment hardship of female 
graduates increases to about 10 per cent, and is about 9 per cent for males (Ziderman 
(2003) reports a similar finding).  However, and a critical finding, is that under the 
same conditions, the average repayment hardship of unlucky female graduates rises to 
about 29 per cent and for males the figure is 23 per cent. But it is important to note 
that there are important differences between age groups in estimations of repayment 
hardships, with the figures reaching 43 per cent and 32 per cent for females and males 
in the last year of repayment. These burdens should be considered to be excessive and 
unacceptable in policy terms. 
 
To sum up, the current SLF is very generous in terms of repayment hardship for the 
borrowers. However, the scheme appears to be unsatisfactory in terms of the extent of 
the implicit subsidies. In other words, the repayment hardship of loan recipients is 
relatively low, while the implicit subsidy is relatively high. Nevertheless, if all forms 
of subsidy are taken away (that is, the nominal interest rate increases and there are no 
grace periods of repayment and interest charge) that proportion of graduates earning 
very low incomes will likely experience great difficulties in repaying the loan. 
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Repayment hardships of an average versus an unlucky graduate under four 
different SLF schemes 
 
Figure A1: Proportion of total payment to total income for average and unlucky 




















































Top left: 1 per cent interest rate, female  Top right: 1 per cent interest rate, male 
Bottom left: 7 per cent interest rate, female   Bottom left: 7 per cent interest rate, male 
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Figure A2: Proportion of total payment to total income for average and unlucky graduates 

























































Top left: 1 per cent interest rate, female  Top right: 1 per cent interest rate, male 
Bottom left: 7 per cent interest rate, female  Bottom left: 7 per cent interest rate, male 
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Figure A3: Proportion of total payment to total income for average and unlucky graduates 

























































Top left: 1 per cent interest rate, female  Top right: 1 per cent interest rate, male 
Bottom left: 7 per cent interest rate, female  Bottom left: 7 per cent interest rate, male 
 
   26
Figure A4: Proportion of total payment to total income for average and unlucky graduates 

























































Top left: 1 per cent interest rate, female  Top right: 1 per cent interest rate, male 
Bottom left: 7 per cent interest rate, female  Bottom left: 7 per cent interest rate, male 
 
 